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What accounts for the diversity and limited concentration that haslong characterized the
organization of the advertising agency industry? This question is addressedby treating an
advertising agency as a multiproduct firm.Thefirm's product line or service mix is defined in
terms of the set of different media categories where anagency places the advertising messages
which it creates on behalf of its clients. Evidence is presentedindicating that the structure of
demand and costs in the advertising agency industry conforms to the conditionsthat MacDonald
and Slivinski (1987) showed were required for an industry to sustainan equilibrium with
diversified firms.
Building on this framework, we formulate a set of three hypotheses relating to the
realization of product-specific scale and scope economies. The firsttwo hypotheses posit that
given low fixed costs and minimal entry barriers, both media-specific scale andscope economies
are available and can be exploited by relatively small-size agencies. The thirdhypothesis
suggests that large agencies may experience diseconomies of scope as a consequence of excessive
diversification induced by two pervasive industry institutionalphenomena: (i) "bundling" of
agency services to match client demand for a mix of media advertising; and (ii) "conflict policy
which prohibits an agency from serving competing accounts andoperates as a mobility constraint.
Utilizing a multiproduct cost function, we estimate media-specific scale andscope
economies for a cross-section of 401 U.S. agencies in 1987. The results obtainedsupport the set
of three hypotheses outlined above.
The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of thesefindings for the
restructuring currently underway in the industry wherein strategies favored by major agencies a
decade ago are now being reversed or drastically revised. In particular, theresurgence of interest
in small agencies and the trend away from the longstanding relianceon fixed commission rates
as the preferred method of agency compensation are in line with our findings on thepresence of
size-related cost economies. Furthermore, the abandonment of "onestop shopping' and the
"unbundling" of the traditional mix of services are interpreted in light of institutional practices
which may influence decisions relating toagency efficiency and diversification.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Host of the large body of theoretical and empirical studies of advertising
has tended to focus on issues relating to the amount firms expend for
advertising, and the effects those outlays have on the behavior of consumers and
competitors.1 As Caves [1986] has discussed, sellers' decisions about the
information they supply are influenced not only by the demands of buyers, but
also by the costs and technological capabilities of alternative channels and
media available for transmitting messages. However, economic analysis of the
costs and organization of the production of advertising has been meager at best.
Sellers typically "buy" rather than "make" the services required to
produce and disseminate their advertising messages; the principal suppliers of
those services are independent advertising agencies. An advertising agency
generally serves a number of clients for whom it creates and places advertising
messages in various communication media. In terms of the basic functions
performed, the nature of the services agencies supply has undergone little
change since early in the century. Pope 11983, p. 143] has shown that "the
evolution from space broker to advertising creator to marketing advisor was
quite swift" and that by the early 1920's, the modern "full service agency" had
become the predominant organizational form within the industry. However, over
time as new communications technologies were introduced, agencies broadened the
composition of their output to encompass an ever-expanding array of print and
broadcast media alternatives (Beniger [1986]).
In this paper we seek to address a recurring, yet largely neglected
question concerning the advertising agency industry, namely, what accounts for
the diversity and limited concentration that has long characterized the
organization of this industry?ADVERTISING AGENCIES AS MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS -Page2 -
Ourapproach here is to treat an advertising agency as a multiproductfirm
where its "product line" or service mix is defined interms of the set of
different media categories where an agency places theadvertising messages which
it creates on behalf of its clients. Wepresent evidence indicating that the
advertising agency industry possesses a number of the characteristics that
MacDonald and Slivinski [19811 have identified in their model ofmultiproduct
firms as those which give rise to a competitiveequilibrium with diversified
firms --namely,free entry, low fixed costs, and demandunevenly distributed
across products. Moreover, we identify two additional phenomena that
significantly impact market structure. The first is an industrynorm know-n as
"conflict policy" which bars an agency fromserving competing accounts. We
argue that this policy functions as a mobility constraint (Caves and Porter
[1977]) that induces growing agencies to diversify intonew types of products,
rather than to expand in existing ones. The secondnoteworthy attribute of this
industry is that clients generally advertise simultaneously inseveral media;
accordingly, advertising agencies typically "bundle" their services.Together,
the joint presence of media bundling on the demandside and conflict policy on
the supply side constitute institutional constraintsthan induce firms to
diversify more extensively than might otherwise becost-justified. These
considerations naturally lead to a set of hypothesesrelating the realization of
scope and scale economies to the size and product mix characteristics of
advertising agencies.
Utilizing the multiproduct agency cost function developedby Silk and
Berndt [1993], we obtain estimates ofproduct-specific scale and scope economies
for a cross-section of 401 US agencies. Our resultsindicate the presence of
substantial scale and scope economies for allcategories of media output
investigated, and wide variability among agencies in terms ofrealizing these
economies. Consistent with our hypotheses, we show that thiscross-sectionalADVERTISING AGENCIES AS MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS
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heterogeneityin product-specific scale andscope economies is related to
overall agency size and product-line diversification.
Moreover, we report
evidence of excess diversification consistent with theexistence of conflict
policy operating as an institutional mobility barrier.
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section IIwe summarize and analyze
evidence bearing on the salient features of the
advertising agency industry,
including possible sources of economies of scale andscope. In Section III we
review MacDonald and Slivinskj's [1987]
theory of the equilibrium structure ofa
competitive industry with Inultiproduct firms, and relateit to the advertising
Industry. Following that, we review theoretical foundationsfor the measurement
of various size-related scale andscope economies in the context of multiproduct
cost functions This theoretical basis enables us to formulatea set of
hypotheses which can be investigatedempirically. In Section IV we discuss data
sources and measurement issues, and then in Section Vwe present empirical
findings. The implications of our findings forunderstanding market structure
in the advertising agency industryare the focus of Section VI, Concluding
remarks, Caveats and suggestions for further researchare given in Section VII.
Appendix A provides detailed mathematical derivations,
while Appendix B presents
summary statistics for agency output variables.
II. THE ADVERTISING AGENCY BUSINESS
2.1 Industry Market Structure
The structure of the advertisingagency business has long been
characterized by two significant features:(a) a relatively low level of
concentration and (b) marked diversityamong firms with respect to both the
size and composition of theiroutputs.
In 1977, the share of total U.S.receipts (gross income) earned by all
agencies which were captured by the largest 25, 100 and500 firms were 34 91,ADVERTISING AGENCIES AS MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS -Page
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49.6%and 62.0%, respectively. The comparable figures for 1987 were 33.8%,
49.1% and 60.9%. respectively.2 Thus, the same low level of concentrationwas
maintained over the decade 1977-87. This stability is noteworthy inasmuchas
the mid-1980's was a period when takeover activity within theadvertising
industry aroused considerable concern and controversy, especially a wave of
mergers and acquisitions involving some of the largest US agencies (Miliman
[1988)).
According to the definitions and counts found in the 1987 Census of
Service Industries (US Bureau of the Census [1989], Table la), therewere 11,606
advertising agencies (firms) operating in that year. As indicated by the
concentration levels noted above, the vast majority of theseagencies were very
small operations --52.3%of the agencies operating the entire year in 1987 had
gross incomes of less than $250,000 (roughly equivalent to billings of $1.67
million for ad production and media time andspace charges) and 77.3% had fewer
than ten employees (U.S. Bureau of the Census [1989], Tables 4aand Sa, pp. 1-
154 and 1-155, respectively).
The U.S. advertising market consists of twosegments of almost equal size,
differentiated by the geographical scope of the advertisers'operations:
"national" vs. "local" (Owen and Weldrjian [1992],pp. 11-14). Approximately 55%
of total U.S. advertising outlays is accounted forby national advertisers who
spend large budgets in media reaching for a broad, national audience(e.g.,
network television and magazines). The other 45% is accounted forby local
advertisers, primarily retailers, who serve geographically limited markets and
utilize media with suitably targeted audiences (e.g.,newspapers, and spot radio
and television) The presence of numerous local advertisers located throughout
the economy supports a diversearray of small, independent and geographically
dispersed agencies. This condition also allows new firms to enter the fieldonADVERTISING AGENCIES AS HIJLTIPRODUCT FIRMS -Page5 -
alimited scale and to shift their clientele base over time from localto
national advertisers (Rothenberg (1991]).
The principal services that agencies supply to their clientsare those
associated with the planning of campaigns and the creation, productionand
placement of advertising messages in different communications media.As show-n
by Schmalensee, Silk and BoJanek (1983] and as will be demonstrated further
below (Appendix B, Table Bl), agencies differ considerably inregards to the
size and composition of their product lines. The latter ismanifested in how
the volume of advertising an agency produces is distributedacross various
communications media. Overall, then, the supply of agencies availableto serve
U.S. advertisers is not only abundant in terms of numbers, but also
heterogeneous in terms of the scale and scope of their operations.
in line with this market structure, competitionamong agoncios for clients
is intense (Goldman (1992]). The uncertaintysurrounding agency-client
relations is a pervasive feature of the advertisingindustry. A study conducted
by the American Association of Advertising Agencies [1985)among 335 of its
member agencies found that new clients acquired in 1984represented the
equivalent of 17.6% of all clients served in the previousyear, while client
losses during 1984 accounted for 13% of those served in theprior year. The
median length of all the agency-client relationships in which thissample of
agencies was involved was 3-4 years.
In selecting a new agency, clients often invite a numer ofagencies to
compete for the assignment and then employ a multi-stage screening process to
arrive at a final choice. Advertising performance is difficult to evaluate and
agencies have traditionally competed for accounts on the basis of reputation for
creativity, service capabilities, and location.
There has been a longstanding debate within the industry as to whether the
creative quality of the advertising produced by anagency is related to theADVERTISING AGENCIES AS MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS -Page6 -
agency'ssize, with many believing the relationship is an inverse one
(Micklethwait [1990], p. 4; Sloan [1992]). As discussed further below, agency
operations involve few fixed or sunk Costs and in general, the absence of entry
(or exit) barriers facilitiates the birth of new firms and serves to enhance
competition among agencies (Marshall [1988]). Data reported in the 1977 and
1987 Census of Services indicates that over this period, the number of agencies
(firms) operating in the US rose from 7,633 (U.S. Bureau of Census [1977], Table
4, p. 1-99) to 11,606 in 1987, an increase of 52.1%. Thus, over the 1977-87
decade, the supply of agencies available to serve advertisers appears to have
grown faster than the level of national advertising expenditures in real terms
(42.1%) .
Finally,for decades, it was standard practice for clients to compensate
their agencies via a flat 15% commission tied to the amount the client expended
on media time and space. While studies conducted by the Association of National
Advertisers among large national advertisers in 1986 and 1989 indicate that
reliance on the 15% rate has diminished somewhat over time (Association of
National Advertisers (1986]; Weilbacher [19891), the commission system continues
to be the dominant mode of agency compensation and the larger the advertiser,
the greater the utilization of commissions rather than fees.
2.2 Demand for Asency Services
Campaigns undertaken by advertisers typically call for the development and
placement of advertising messages in a number of different types of media.
Given differences in advertisers' target markets and the composition of
audiences for various media, the mix of media selected to deliver advertising
messages will tend to vary across industry sectors or product categories. To
show the extent of this variability, we examined the 1987 media allocations made
by the 200 leading US national advertisers operating in 31 different product
categories. The data covered seven major classes of media (newspapers,ADVERTISING ACENCIES AS MULTIPRODUCT FIRES -Page7 -
magazines,outdoor, network television, spot television, network radio, andspot
radio). As a measure of the extent to which a given advertisingexpenditure is
unevenly allocated across the set of media classes, we computed the value of the
Herfindahl Index, H (H — S where Sj is medium j's share of total
expenditures) for each of the 31 product categories. Note that if some
advertising outlay were spread equally across all seven media classes, the value
of H would be 0.143. In fact, we observe that the median value of H forthe 31
categories is 0.317, with the range being from 0.209 to 0.724, indicating
considerable inequality in advertising outlays across media. Thesignificance
of this phenomenon becomes apparent when examined in light ofa special type of
mobility constraint placed on agencies concerning which clients theymay serve.
Specifically, an important influence on Competition among agencies for
clients is the industry's norm on "conflict policy" whichessentially prohibits
an agency from serving competing accounts (American Association ofAdvertising
Agencies [1979]). Although agencies create and produce advertising, the
standard contractual arrangements stipulate that theproperty rights to this
advertising belong to the advertiser (Weilbacher [1991), chapter 13). In
addition to controlling the advertising itself, advertisers also seek to
maintain the confidentiality of strategic information which itsagency obtains
in the course of working together. Hence, thepurpose of the conflict policy
norm is to prevent the unauthorized leakage of propriety information. Whilethe
definition and interpretation of competition is often a matter of dispute
between agencies and clients, adherence to the conflict norm is the general
practice of the industry4 (Sinian [1989]). Therefore, in order to add non-
competing accounts, an agency must expand the range of product categories or
industries it serves, and so the larger the agency, the more diverse its product
account portfolio.5 Moreover, as discussed further below given product categoryADVERTISING AGENCIES AS MULTIPRODUCT FIRNS -Page8 -
differencesin the mix of media demanded, growth in agency size will typically
also entail greater diversity of media outputs.
2.3 Agency Cost and Organization Structure
The sources of potential economies of scale and scope in advertising
agency operations may be traced to features of their cost and organizational
structures. As suggested by the oft-repeated saw that "an advertising agency is
nothing but people" (Mayer [1959], p. 74), the fixed component of agency costs
is relatively small as the principal expenses associated with agency operations
are labor-related charges. Studies show payroll, bonuses, profit-sharing, and
employee benefits average about 60-65X of an agency's gross income (American
Association of Advertising Agencies [1987], p. 13 and McDonald [1989]). Agency
employment levels are notoriously sensitive to changes in economic conditions
and client turnover.
Agencies typically employ some form of matrix organization (Comanor, Mover
and Smiley (1981]; McNainara [1990]). Such a structure reflects the division of
labor occurring within an agency involving specialization along two dimensions:
(a) function or task, e.g. ,creative,production, media, research and/or client
contact; and (b) type of output, differentiated on the basis of communication
medium, e.g., broadcast, print, direct response, promotion, public relations.
These patterns are displayed in Figure 1.
INSERTFIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
While structured into departments corresponding to the basic functions an
agency performs for its clients, an agency deploys its professional personnel in
account teams, each of which is staffed by a group of functional specialists and
assigned to serve a specific client.ADVERTISING AGENCIES AS MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS -Page9 -
Thesebasic features of agency operations -- laborintensiveness and
matrix organization --embodyvarious aspects of shared costs, specialization
and imperfect divisibility of inputs that are phenomena generally identifiedas
the antecedents of scale and scope economies. To illustrate, experienced
industry practitioners have observed that the size and composition of an account
team required to serve a client tends to remain relatively fixed over a
considerable range of variations in the size of accounts, as measured by the
amount a client expends for media time and space (Weilbacher [1991)). In a
similar vein, an agency's costs of performing certain functions may vary by
medium because media differ with respect to their divisibility and minimum
transaction size (Poltrack [1983], Porter [1976]).
While these phenomena bear directly on a number of controversial industry
issues such as the economic rationales for merger and acquisitions, andagency
compensation methods, they have not been subjected to a great deal of systematic
empirical study. Recently, however, Silk and Berndt [1993] reported results of
an econometric study which showed that Llobal scale and scope economies play a
major role in determining agency costs. As elaborated below, hero we extend
that work to investigate product-specific scale and scope economies.
Clearly, clients' demands for agency services reflects the mix of media
employed to satisfy their campaign goals. The presence of economies of scale
and scope in jointly producing and placing advertising for that mix of media
suggests a plausible rationale for advertising agencies operating as
aultiproduct firms who are capable of efficiently supplying the set of media-
related services demanded by clients. We now briefly review some relevant
economic theory and relate it to advertising agency operations.ADVERTISING AGENCIES AS MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS -Page10 -
III.THE UNDERLYING ECONOMIC ThEORY OF MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS
3.1Market Equilibrium with Multioroduct Firms
The nature of competitive equilibrium and market structure in the context
of multiproduct firms has received relatively little theoretical attention and,
to the best of our knowledge, hardly any empirical examination. Here we wish to
focus on how the (apparently stable) structure of the advertising agency
industry is affected by technology, demand, and institutional mobility
constraints. As we shall now see, it is useful to begin by summarizing the
theoretical results reported by MacDonald and Slivinski [1987] --hereafter,MS.
MS consider a two-product market model in which firms can either
specialize (produce only one good) or diversify (produce both goods). The
structure of the industry in competitive equilibrium is shown to take one of
three forms:(i) all firms diversified, none specialized; (ii) all firms
specialized, none diversified; (iii) diversified firms and only one type of
specialized firm operate contiguously. Which of these three equilibria occurs
depends on costs and demands.
Specifically, when the fixed costs of diversified firms are sufficiently
low, a diversified equilibrium will obtain. Moreover, in a diversification
equilibrium, all firms will be identical in their output mix ("politically
correct diversification"). For intermediate values of the fixed cost, the mixed
outcome with only one type of specialized firm (producing, say, good j) is more
likely when demand is skewed toward good j, and is more likely to be a
diversified equilibrium when demand is symmetric. The extent of demand skewing
required to generate the mixed eqilibrium is smaller, the larger is the
diversified firm's fixed costs. Finally, in the mixed equilibrium with
diversified and only one type of specialized firms, the specialized firms play
an "industry fringe" or buffer role, absorbing all variations in demand for the
good they produce.ADVERTISING AGENCIES AS MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS -Page11 -
Itis useful to relate the MS results to the structure of the advertising
agency industry, as described in Section II, and to the empirical estimates of
global scale and scope economies reported in Silk and Berndt [1993].
Specifically, the fact that concentration is relatively low and that there are
thousands of fins in this industry in the US is consistent with the evidence
cited earlier indicating that fixed costs do not constitute an effective barrier
to entry. The implication of this set of conditions is that scale economies can
be realized at relatively small levels of output. Furthermore, the fact that
almost all fins in this industry are multiproduct rather than single-product
firms (86% of the sample of agencies discussed below produce six or more
outputs) suggests that the incremental fixed costs of being diversified rather
than specialized are not substantial, and that economies of scope can also be
realized and exploited by relatively small-sized firms. Finally, since the
pattern of diversification is non-uniform across firms (about 19% of the
agencies in our sample produce six outputs, 23% produce seven outputs, 26% eight
outputs, and 18% nine outputs), the existence of a diversified equilibrium
suggests that demand skewness may have a significant impact on industry
structure. In particular, as noted in Section 11.1, small advertising agencies
tend to play a fringe role in the national advertising market by serving
geographically-specific niches.
In addition to these traditional cost and demand factors facing the
advertising agency industry, the existence of an institutional norm constraining
mobility behavior -- namely,the aforementioned "conflict policy" may generate
further incentives to diversify. To see this, recall that as discussed in
Section 2.2, within any product category or industry, empirically it is the case
that advertising expenditures tend to be unevenly distributed across media
categories. Moreover, and very important in our context, this media skewness
varies markedly across industries and their products. If an advertising agencyADVERTISING AGENCIES AS MULTIPRODIJCT FIRMS
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wishesto expand, it is therefore much more likely to find a conflicting client
within its existing set of media than it is by expanding into other media.
Hence, by adding another media to its service mix rather than expanding within
current media, an advertising agency is more likely to find a client in an
industry different from those industries already being served, i.e., to find a
non-conflicting client. This suggests, therefore, that in order to mitigate the
adverse effects of client conflict conventions, the larger the size of an
advertising agency, the more likely it is to expand its mix of media beyond that
which is strictly cost-justified.
In this paper we will analyze empirically the relationships among scale
economies, scope economies, and firm size in the advertising agency industry.
We will also examine whether measures of scope economies suggest that these
conflict conventions have impacted costs in a negative manner. To undertake
such an analysis, it is first necessary to formulate a model in which these
concepts are clearly defined. To that we now turn our attention.
3.2Models of Scale and Scope Economies
In order to understand better the implications of scope and scale
economies for industry structure, it is necessary to define more rigorously the
notions of global economies of scope and scale, and in particular, to
distinguish these notions from product-specific economies of scope and scale.
We begin with the overly simplified single-product of conventional economics
textbooks, in which the average cost function is approximately L-shaped, with
average cost approaching an asymptotic lower bound as a scale-related Z variable
approaches infinity. A reasonable specification for a cost function having such
a shape is:
u —a+flea, (1)
where U is a measure of average cost, Z is a scale-related variable, and a,
and y are (assumed positive) parameters. This function is illustrated in FigureADVERTISING AGENCIES AS MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS -Page13 -
2below; its shape is broadly consistent with the literature on economies of





Givenpositive values of the parameters, Eq. (1) postulates that U is an
everywhere-decreasing function of Z, implying there is no finite Z at which
scale economies are entirely exhausted. Note that as Z -., U-.a.One can say
that scale economies are essentially exhausted for a firm of size Z if U(Z*) —
(l+E)a,whereis a small number. Solving for Z, we obtain an indicator of
minimum efficient scale as:
Z —-(l/'y)ln(a€/fi), (2)
wherewe might set —.01,sothat a scale of Zcorresponds to Costs one
percentabove the asymptotic minimum.
Instead of assuming that firms produce but one product, we now become more
realistic and consider a firm producing N different outputs or services. In
this case Eq. (1), with j subscripts everywhere, refers to the unit Cost of the
th service product where the unit cost term U is re-defined as total costs
divided by gross income (Y). Multiplying by the revenue share Si and su1ming,





Depending on the specification, Z can take on alternative functions of all
the output levels. In Silk and Berndt [1993], a variety of formulations of the
Z scale variable were considered, both theoretically and empirically. In the
most general version of their preferred cost specification, the scale variable
for each service product is simply the overall size of the th agency, measured







wherethe Ujareassumed to be normal disturbance terms with all the usual
desirable properties. Silk and flerndt reported that in the preferred empirical
model, the parameter restrictions —-3r and —fi, j — 1 N, were imposed.7
Hereafter we incorporate those parameter constraints.
The above formulation of a multiproduct cost function accommodates global
economies of scope. To see this, recall that what global scope economies refer
to is the cost savings to a firm from producing N multiple services, rather than
splitting the firm up into N smaller firms, each specializing in producing one
and only one service output.8 More specifically, let C be total (not average)
costs, and define total costs CSplit for the notional split-up multiservice firm
as the sum of costs from producing each of the N services at N distinct single-
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Totalcosts for the multiproduct firmjointlyproducing all N outputs are
—C(Y1,Y2,...•N• Global returns to scope (RSP) are then simply computed as






Hence, when global RSParepositive, Cjj1 < and there are cost
advantanges to being a multiproduct firm,derivingperhaps from specialization
and the joint utilization of shared inputs. When RSP are zero, no such cost
advantages emerge, and if RSP were negative, the firm could reduce its costs by
splitting up. The fact that it is rare for an agency to create and place
advertising in a single medium suggests that RSP are available.9
The scale and scope cost function presented in Eq. (4) allows for non-zero
global scope economies. Noting that Sjj —1for the firm producing only the




+ exP(-iY1.) . (7)
On the other hand, since Sij —Yjj/YjYS1i —Yjj
it follows that for the
specification in Eq. (4), Cjoit equals:
CjothtEQJY + 1fi.YijP7.Y1Y
(8)
We can therefore write the expression for global returns to scope (RSP) for
agency i from Eq. (6) corresponding to the niultiproduct cost function fromEq.





Note that the expression in the numerator of (9), C51j - does not
depend on the a's, but will typically be non-zero because exP(--1.Yi)
exp(-rYi), implying that in general RSPi 0.
Before distinguishing global from product-specific economies of scope, we
briefly consider measures of scale economies. In a model with multiple service
outputs, the traditional measure of returns to scale is ambiguous. To see this,
recall that in the case of a single product firm, the traditional measure of
returns to scale is •the ratio of average cost (C/Y) to marginal cost (BC/BY).
In the multi-service case, however, the notion of average cost is not well-
defined (by which output does one divide total costs?), and product mix could
change with overall size (by how much does one change the various outputs?).
There are several ways to overcome this problem.
First, one can define a returns to scale notion as that based on the
effects on total costs when all services are increased proportionately, i.e.
holding service output mix constant. This concept is called global or ray-
returns to scale (overall size expands on a linear ray in output space; see
Bailey and Friedlaender 11982]). In our context, define global or ray returns
to scale as the ratio of average to marginal cost for where —
jYjj,
holding service output mix fixed:
RRS —C/Yi — (10)
ac/BY 5ij —5ij

















An alternative measure of scale economies that is very useful in the
context of multiproduct firms is that of medium-specific scale economies; it is
due to Bailey-Friedlaender (1982, p. 1030J. For output j, medium-specific
returns to scale, SCL1j1 is defined as the ratio of average incremental cost,
AICij. to marginal cost, MCij:
SCLij —AICij/MCij. (12)
where average incremental cost is defined as the incremental average cost of
adding a new product j to a firm previously having only N-i product lines,
AICij —(C(YiN)
-C(YiNj)]/Yij (13)
where C(YiN) is the total cost to firm i of producing all N outputs and
C(YjNJ) is the total cost of producing all N outputs except output j, and
where MCij is defined as the traditional MC1j —OC(YiN)/BYij.
For the
multiproduct cost function of Eq. (4), product-specific returns to scale turn









where k 'j.Note from Eq. 11 that while RRS for firm i (ray returns to scale)
quantifies global scale economies as all N outputs are increased by the same
proportion, product-specific scale economies, SCL1 based on Eq. 14 computes
scale economies assuming that the amount of output j is increased from zero toADVERTISING AGENCIES AS MULTIPRODIJCT FIRNS -Page18 -
somefinite number, while all other outputs are held fixed. Hence, while RRSi
is computed as ACj/MCj. SCLjj —AICjj/MCjj.
For our purposes, it will be informative to calculate product-specific
scope economies for firm i, which we denote as SCPjj. The intuition behind this
calculation is to quantify cost savings for producing output jjointlybut
incrementally (given production of the N-j other outputs) compared to producing
output j separately. Note in particular that the cost comparison here is not as
dramatic as that for global scope economies (unless there are only two outputs,
in which case global and product-specific scope economy measures are identical);
here we examine a more "marginal" situation in which a firm considers adding one
more product to its existing set of products, and determines whether it is more
cost effective to produce it within the firm or to produce it via a subsidiary.
In particular, the firm is not considering the possibility of producing all its
products in separate subsidiaries.
Following Wang and Friedlaender [1985, p. 253] ,onecan therefore define
product-specific scope economies as:
C(Y1) -[C(YN -C(Y SCP — ' 1 (15)
ij C(YjN)
where C(Yjj) is the total cost of producing Yjj separately, and C(YjN) and
C(Yi,Nj) are, respectively, total costs when all N, and all N except j,outputs
are produced jointly by firm i. Thus Eq. 15 represents the percent Costsavings
(dissavings)realized by producing output j jointly, rather than separately.
For the inultiproduct cost function of Eq. (4), product-specific scope economies
turn out to be (see Appendix A for a more complete derivation) ,wherej k and
m denotes specific media output m:ADVERTISING AGENCIES AS MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS -Page19 -
N-j





Although Silk and Berndt [1993) did not consider of Iroduct-specjflc scale
and scope economies, they did report estimates of 1oba1 scale and scope
economies. In terms of scale, Silk-Berndt reported that the minimum efficient
size agency had gross income of $3.-4 million (equivalently, billings of $20-27
million). Thus of the almost 12,0000 firms comprising the industry in 1987,
approximately 200-250 had operating levels sufficiently large to take full
advantage of all available size-related efficiencies; these 200-250 firms
accounted for about 57% of total industry output (gross income). For firms
operating at only 50% of minimum efficient scale, however, the cost penalty was
substantial --varyingfrom 8 to 15%, depending on the medium. Thus, while
potential global scale economies are important, they have been exploited by a
large number of firms. With respect to estimated global economies of scope,
Silk-Berndt reported that the sample median cost savings attributable to joint
production were about 26%. Further, although global scope economies were
exhausted for the very largest firms, scope economies were of considerable
consequence for smaller agencies in that their Costs were highly sensitive to
the mix of media services provided.
With this as background, we now ask: What should one expect in a
competitive equilibrium in terms of product-specific economies of scope and
scale? First, it bears noting that the existence of a diversified equilibrium
in the advertising agency industry is not necessarily inconsistent with the
presence or absence of global economies of scope, since that concepr refers to
an "all or nothing" total cost comparison involving totally integrated vs.
totally atomistic product line production.ADVERTISING AGENCIES AS MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS
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However,we would expect that at the margin, any multiproduct firm would
not expand products into the region of negative product-specific scope
economies, for another firm could enter without producing that product line and
would therefore not experience that cost disadvantage. Hence, in a competitive
equilibrium, we would not expect product-specific scope economies to differ
substantially from zero. A similar line of reasoning suggests that we should
also expect that in a competitive equilibrium, product-specific scale economies
would be exhausted as well.
Recall from our earlier discussion that there are two reasons we might
expect to find product-specific diseconomies of scope. First, as discussed in
Section 2.2, the typical advertiser usually places advertising in a Set of
media, and hence an agency must supply a bundle or mix of media services
simultaneously. lJnbundllng would impose transactions costs on the advertiser
(see Teece [1982)). Second, as also discussed in Section 2.2, in this industry
we observe the presence of a very special institutional mobility constraint in
the form of conflict policy, which essentially prohibits an agency from serving
competing accounts. With conflict policy, firms face incentives to expand by
diversifying into other product lines.
In suaary, together the joint presence of media bundling on the demand
side and conflict policy on the supply side constitute institutional constraints
which may give rise to cost inefficiencies such as diseconomies of scope.1°
Having discussed and rigorously defined the concepts of product-specific
economies of scale and scope, we can now formulate three hypotheses about the
nature of size-related economies in the advertising agency industry:
(1) Product-specific scale economies can be realized at relatively low levels of
output. The argument underlying this prediction is that fixed costs are low and
do not constitute an effective barrier to entry.(ii) Product-specific
economies of scope can be realized and exploited by relatively small-sizedADVERTISING AGENCIES AS MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS -Page21 -
firms.This proposition follows from our conjecture that the incremental fixed
costs of being diversified vs. specialized are not substantial.(iii) The
larger the size of an agency, ceteris paribus, the more likely it is to expand
its media mix beyond that which is strictly cost-justified (into the region of
negative product-specific economies of scope), in order to mitigate the adverse
effects of client conflict strictures. As argued above we expect this to
occur, since given product category differences in media mix, the existence of a
conflict policy induces agencies that seek to grow to diversify their product
mix rather than to expand existing product lines.
We now describe our data base, and then present empirical evidence on
product-specific economies of scale and scope.
IV. DATA BASE DESCRIPTION AND VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Thedata base we utilize in our empirical study consists of a set of 1987
operating results for a cross section of 401 agencies compiled by Advertisint
[1988). The sample contains a broad distribution of agencies of different
sizes serving a diverse body of clients by producing advertising for
dissemination through a wide variety of media)-1 A noteworthy feature of the
data collection procedure was that participating agencies were asked to submit a
statement signed by an independent accountant verifying the data report.
The definitions of the variables and measures employed in our analysis are
as follows:
Y —agencygross income for U.S. operations (10
millions of 1987 dollars).
E —agencyemployment in U.S.operations(nwnber
of employees in 1987).
U —E/Yl03or number of employees per $100,000
of 1987 gross income.
Sj —shareof an agency's billings volume derived
from output j, where j —1 8 representADVERTISING AGENCIES AS MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS
-Page22 -
alternativemedia categories and j—9 denotes
billings and/or capitalized fees derived from
all non-media specific services.
Yj —Sj
"1 —estimatedgross income from output j
An agency's gross income is best interpreted as the equivalent of the
usual accounting definition of "gross margin" or the difference betweeen sales
receipts and cost of goods sold. Cross income Y for US operations of firm i
(in tens of millions of 1987 dollars) is computed as the sum of revenues it
receives from (i) commissions earned from purchases of media time and space made
on behalf of clients; (ii) markups on materials and services purchased from
other suppliers and then charged to clients; and (iii) fees paid by clients for
agency services in addition to or in lieu of the aforementioned commissionsand
markups. Within the industry, gross income is often used in analyses of agency
"productivity" and is regarded as the preferred measure of agency size or output
because it is more meaningful for comparative or cross sectional analysis than
other indicators such as billings volume or capitalized billings, the latter of
which may give a misleading picture of output or scale due to variations across
agencies in media and service mixes and compensation methods (Gardner [1976] and
Paster t1980]).
As a proxy for an agency's average cost Uj, we employ "number of employees
per hundred thousand dollars of gross income," and thereby implicitly assume the
absence of systematic cross-sectional wage differentials. As noted earlier,
studies indicate that labor costs (payroll, bonuses, profit-sharing, and related
employee benefits such as insurance and retirement), typically acount for about
two-thirds of an agency's total expenses. Given the reasons discussed above for
preferring gross income over billings as a measure of agency output, it is also
advantageous to measure unit cost by the ratio of employees to gross income
rather than "employees per million dollars of billings".ADVERTISING AGENCIES AS MULTIL'RODUCT FIRMS -Page23
The data reported in Advertising Age [1988] encompassed billings in
fifteen distinct media categories. We have combined some of the minor mediato
arrive at a set of nine separate categories: network television (TVL),spot
television (TVH), general magazines (MOL), specialty print (PTH),newspapers
(NPH), direct response (DRH), radio (RDH), display (DSP) and non-media services
(XM). "Display" is an aggregation of four small media types: outdoor, point of
sale, transit, and special events. The "non-media" share of billings
encompasses a broad spectrum of services, the composition of which may vary
across agencies. Included here are ad production and specialized services or
projects such as marketing research, public relations, and sales promotion.
Further discussion of the measurement issues posed by the heterogeneity of this
category is given in Silk and Berndt [1993].
The share of an agency's billings volume in each media/servicecategory,
S ,isassumed to be an unbiased estimate of the share of its gross income
attributable to that category of output. It is worth noting that this
assumption is strictly valid only if the ratio of gross income to billings is a
constant for all categories of output within each agency (but not necessarily
fixed across agencies). As discussed by McNamara ([1990],pp. 140-141), while
margins may vary among accounts served within a particular agency (according to
client size and method of compensation), in general clients tend to favor
constant margins across media in order to remove any incentive for the agency to
favor one medium over another. Unfortunately, the information required to check
this condition directly is not available.'2 Given data on Y andS for firm 1,
we therefore compute estimated gross income from output i,Yj asYjj —Sij.Yj.
The data utilized here do not include results for international
activities. Subsidiaries and conglomerate agencies were treated as distinct
firms. In the case of ten "mega-agencies," the results for their subsidiaries
were excluded from the parent firm data in line with the information on theseADVERTISING AGENCIES AS MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS
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relationshipsreported in Advertising Age [1988, pp. 4 and 96). Further
details on these variables and data sources are given in Silk-berndt ([1992].
Appendix A).
V. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
In this section we present estimates of medium-specific scale and scope
economies for our sample of 401 agencies, calculated using the parameter
estimates from our preferred unit cost model Eq. (4). For each agency, we
computed the values of SCLij and SCPij. the indices of product-specific scale
and scope economies defined above in Eqs. (14) and (16), respectively, for all
of the media categories (j —1,...9) where the agency's output was nonzero.
These two equations are highly nonlinear functions of agency-specific variables
(media shares and gross income) and the estimated parameters. Note that one
parameter, a-- theasymptotic unit cost of the jL1media(employees per
$100,000 of gross income) -- playsa critical role in these scale and scope
calculations. In Silk and Berndt [1993] a variety of test results were reported
involving the aj parameters; the preferred specification restricted several of
these aj'S to be equal across subsets of the nine media. In particular, for
network television, spot television, general magazines, and specialty print, a —
0.74;for newspapers and direct response, a —1.32;for non-media services, a —
1.57;and for radio and display, a —2.17.13
Civen these differences in the a's, we therefore expect associated variability
in the mean levels of scale and scope economies across media.
5.1 flediuzu-SDecific Scale Economies
In Table 1 we present summary statistics for the set of medium-specific
scale estimates. In line with the nature of our model specification which
posits unit cost to be an everywhere decreasing function of output, we find
empirically that the values of virtually all of the scale economy indices exceedADVERTISING AGENCIES AS MIJLTIPRODUCT FIRMS -Page25 -
unity,signifying that to varying degrees, the costs of agency operations in
different media categories are subject to increasing returns to scale.
INSERTTABLE1 ABOUT HERE
Withineachmedia category, the distribution of scale economies is fairly
symmetric,as evidenced by the fact that differences between the means and
mediansare quite small. Thus, the agencies active within any particular media
cateogry tend be highly diverse with respect to operating efficiency as judged
by the extent to which they are able to realize potential scale economies. This
confirms the diversity we expectedJ4
Comparing the values of the medians (or means) in Table 1 across media
categories, we observe that scale economies tend to be least exploited for the
set of four media categories consisting of network television, spot television.
general magazines and speciality print; here the median values of the index of
scale economies are quite high, ranging from about 2.6 to 2.8. Realization of
scale economies is somewhat greater for newspapers and direct response (SCL =2)
and is most prevalent for radio and the two hetereogeneous categories, "display0
and non-media services; here the median SCL's are in the vicinity of 1.4 to 1.6.
In order to examine whether this marked variability is consistent with our
hypothesis that product-specific scale economies can be realized at relatively
low levels of output, we examined the relationship between scale economies and
agency size by regressing our measure of scale economies, SCLij on the
logarithm of agency gross income and a set of additional descriptor variables
that capture the basic features of an agency's outputs. Note that the intlusion
of these other variables in addition to size enables us to control for the
impacts of the covariates also affecting measures of scale and scope in Eqs.
(14) and (16). Results from these regressions are presented in Appendix C.ADVERTISING AGENCIES AS MIJLTIPRODUCT FIRMS
-Page26 -
Basedon the parameter estimates of these regressions, we calculated the
predicted economies of scale as a function of agency size and theother
variables, where all other variables were evaluated at the sample median. Next
we compared the measure of predicted scale economies for two different agency
sizes: an agency whose size equalled the sample median ($3.2 million of gross
income), and a smaller agency only one-half that size. We then computed the
percent difference in the predicted scale economy index, which maybe
interpreted as the percent loss in efficiency by being 50% smaller than the
median-sized agency. If this percent difference is very small, then that would
suggest that product-specific scale economies could be attained by verysmall
agencies, and that even if one were only half the industry norm, most scale
economies could be exploited. We find that these percentage efficiency losses
are indeed very small. In particular, they range from 1.35% for display
advertising to 4.77% for magazine advertising.
We conclude, therefore, that our first hypothesis is supported by the
empirical evidence, i.e., product-specific scale economies can be realized at
relatively low levels of output.
5.2 Medium-Specific Scope Economies
Summary statistics for our measures of product-specific scope economies
are given in Table 2. The first noteworthy feature of these results is that the
median value of the scope economies index for each of the nine media categories
is approximately zero, signifying that the typical agency active in any of these
domains is operating in a manner such that it has essentially already exhausted
the available economies of scope. An implication of these results is that, for
the typical agency active in any media category, there does not appear to be a
discernible cost advantage associated with producing one mote category of media
advertising, given the joint production of the remainder of the typical agency's
media mix.ADVERTISING AGENCIES AS MIJLTIPRODUCT FIRMS -Page27 -
However,as was the case with scale economies, within each of the media
categories, the importance of scope economies appears to vary substantially
across agencies. The range of estimated scope economies coefficients is quite
broad (especially for network and spot television and non-media services) and
encompasses both positive and negative values in all nine media categories.
Furthermore, the distributions of the scope indices tend to be noticeably skewed
in the direction of negative values. Thus, we find that although some agencies
realize a substantial cost advantage through the joint production of the mix of
media advertising they supply (SCPj >0,economies of scope) for many other
agencies there appears to be a pronounced cost disadvantage associated with
producing their mixes of media advertising jointly, rather than dropping one
media (SCPj C0,diseconomies of scope).
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
A clearer picture of the cross-category variability with respect to scope
economies may be obtained by examining the percentages of agencies operating in
each media category for whom joint production of that output is more efficient
than producing it separately from the other components of the media mix--i.e.,
the percent of agencies for whom SCPij >0.As can be seen from Table 3, those
percentages range from a low of approximately 50% (network and spot television)
to highs of 78% and 85% for the direct response and display categories,
respectively. These results are clearly consistent with our second hypothesis,
that scope economies were available and could be exploited by relatively small-
sized firms.
Concerning our third hypothesis and possible evidence for excess
diversification, note that within each of these media categories there are, in
varying numbers, agencies whose operations are subject to some measure ofADVERTISING AGENCIES AS HULTIPRODUCT FIRMS
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diseconomiesof scope and who, as a consequence, might achieve Cost savings by
reducing output and consolidating their media mixes. Recall from our earlier
discussion that the existence of product bundling on the demand side and
conflict policy on the supply side could lead firms to undertake excessive
diversification.
To Investigate this hypothesis, we regressed the measure of scope
economies on the logarithm of agency size and the saaie set of agency descriptor
variables used In the above scale economy analyses. The results of these
regressions are presented in Appendix C.Consistent with our hypothesis, scope
economies were found to be negatively related to agency size, ceteris paribus.
Hence, together the result in Table 2 that anywhere from only 15% to as much as
52% of agencies were operating in regions with product-specific diseconomies of
scope, and the finding that scope economies and size are negatively related,
provide clear support for our third hypothesis: the larger the size of the
agency, ceteris paribus, the more likely an agency is to expand its media mix
beyond that which is strictly cost-justified.
VI. DISCUSSION
The advertising agency business is presently in an unsettled state as the
advertising industry as a whole struggles to adapt itself to changing economic
conditions and the onslaught of new communications technology (Mayer [19911:
Sellers [1993)). As a senior executive of one major agency put it, "The
traditional agency as we have known it will not exist in the next five years.
We're going to see an Incredible amount of change. .. forthe first time in five
decades there is a reinvention of the industry as we know it" (Wells and Sloan
[1993b, p.28]).
The fundamental strategic issues facing agencies are essentially the twin
questions of scope and scale: (i) What mix of services should be offeredADVERTISING AGENCIES AS MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS -Page29 -
clients?and (ii) How large should an agency be? Ouranalysisof agency cost
economics bears on several contemporary developments relating to these
questions, and below we consider the implications of our findings for the
direction restructuring may follow.
Significantly, the dominant strategies favored by major agencies a decade
ago are now being abandoned or drastically revised. In the 1980's, a decline
occured in the share of marketing budgets allocated to traditional mass media
advertising by many large firms. At the same time, spending for consumer and
trade promotions rose and the utilization of other modes of marketing
communications such as direct response grew with the diffusion and application
of information technology (Business Week [1991]; Jones [1993]).In response,
numerous agencies expanded the range of services they offered, often through
mergers and acquisitions, increasing both the scale and the scope of their
operations (Miliman [1988]; Vinski [1991]).
However, beginning in the late 1980's and continuing to the present,
aggregate spending on media advertising declined in real terms, driven In part
by the prolonged recession in the U.S. economy [Jones [1993]). Faced with a
mixture of adverse cyclical and secular conditions, the agency business has now
entered into a period of experimentation. A variety of alternative strategies
and structures have been proposed and introduced. These involve basic shifts in
agency scale and scope, and represent a reversal of developments in the prior
decade.
First, there is a resurgence of interest in sma1l" agencies (Sloan
[1992]). In the past few years, a substantial number of cases have been
reported wherein major advertisers have switched from very large to small or
medium sized independent agencies -- anoticeable departure from the traditional
pattern of large clients preferring to work with large agencies (Goldman 11991)
Sloan [1992]). Furthermore, some of the largest conglomerate agencies haveADVERTISING AGENCIES AS ?{ULTIPRODUCT FIRMS
-Page30 -
themselvesestablished small "spinoff" or satellite agencies, intended to match
the service offered by small independents where clients perceive they can obtain
superior creative work and more attention from senior agency personnel (Landler
[1993]; Wells and Sloan [1993b].
Ourfindingsprovide underpinnings to help understand these developments.
We find that both the scale and scope economies available in producing various
categories of media-related services can be largely realized at modest levelsof
agency size as measured by gross income. In particular, ourresults provide a
basis for answering the question of how small can an agency be without suffering
a serious loss in efficiency?
In our earlier work (Silk and flerndt [1993]), we found that to operate at
minimum efficient size required gross income of $3-4 million (1987$),15 The
results reported here indicate that the loss of efficiency incurred through
operating at half that scale is minor --lessthan 5%. Furthermore, relatively
small-sized agencies are able to exploit available scope economies as evidenced
by our estimates that, depending on the media category, as few as 50% and as
many as 85% of agencies in our sample were able to realize a cost advantage
through the joint production of the mix of media-related services they supplied.
Data reported in the 1987 Census of Services show that there were 493
agencies with gross incomes of $2.5 million or more operating in that year, and
1,512 agencies with gross incomes of $1 million or more. Thus, it appears that
agencies of widely varying sizes are economically viable.
The second area of policy undergoing change is the traditional concept of
a "full service" agency where there is a movement toward the abandonment of
"one-stop shopping" and the "unbundling" of services (Wells (1993]). The
abandonment of "one stop shopping" reflects a failure of agencies to realize the
scope economies which earlier were expected to accompany diversificationinto
such areas as direct marketing, sales promotion, and publication (SellersADVERTISING AGENCIES AS MIJLTIPRODUCT FIRMS
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[1993);Wells [1993]). Thisdiversificationapparently occurred without
effective integration of the various specialized groups. Efforts to cross-sell
a broad range of services were resisted by clients who questioned the uniformity
of the quality of diversified services available from a single agency and who
doubted that one-stop shopping would produce significant savings in transactions
costs.
Agencies that once aspired to be suppliers of a broad range of marketing
communications services are now willing to offer clients creative and/or media
services separately (Mandes [1994a]). Another related development is that some
agencies have adopted a general contractor" model whereby they offer a broad
range of services but outsource certain of them to specialized suppliers
(Mandese [l994b); Wells and Sloan [l993a]). Interestingly, this unbundling and
the attention to small "boutique agencies emphasizing creative services are
consistent with policies advocated two decades ago by Cross [1972) as a means
for developing more effective advertising.
Interpreted in light of our finding that substantial numbers of large
agencies were operating with diseconomies of scope, this downsizing may reflect
actions taken to correct excessive prior diversification. Bundling and conflict
policy make for a "lumpy" product line adjustment process. Given that demand
for agencies' services is cyclical and client turnover commonplace, product line
shifts are frequent occurrences, but the task of maintaining efficiency in
agency operations and avoiding diseconomies of scope is made difficult bythe
complexities which bundling and conflict policy impose.
The third area of agency policy undergoing change is compensation.
Studies of compensation levels and methods Indicate that over time, agencies'
control over the pricing of their services has deteriorated as clients have
become increasingly cost-conscious (Achenbaum [1990]; Lauterborn [1992);
Weilbacher [1990]). The evidence reporttd here indicating the presence of size-ADVERTISING AGENCIES AS MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS -Page32 -
relatedeconomies is consistent with the trend away from the longstanding
reliance on fixed commission rates, and the increased utilization of sliding
scales of commissions and fees based on labor costs (Association of National
Advertisers (l992).
VII. SUMMARY ANDCONCLUSIONS
This paper began by arguing that the basic structure of demand and Costs
in the advertising agency industry closely resembles those conditions which
MacDonald and Slivinski (1987] showed were essential for an industry to sustain
a competitive equilibrium consisting of diversified firms. Building on the
evidence that the agency business is characterized by low fixed costs and
minimal entry barriers, we hypothesized that both media-specific scale and scope
economies could be exploited by relatively small-sized agencies. Our cross-
sectional study produced support for both these hypotheses.
Twoadditionalfeatures of this industry were identified as exerting an
important influence on market structure: (i)) client use of a mix of advertising
media and the concomitant practice of agencies bundling their services; and
(ii) the prohibition against an agency serving competing accounts which operates
as a mobility barrier. We hypothesized that the combined presence of these two
phenomena could lead to excessive diversification, which would manifest itself
in large agencies experiencing diseconomies of scope. Our empirical results
also confirmed this relationship.
The results reported here serve to demonstrate the value of viewing
advertising agencies as multiproduct firms, and offer a foundation for
understanding the highly competitive and fragmented structure that has
historically characterized the advertising industry. Further changes in agency
scale and scope can be expected as agencies seek to position themselves for a
wave of major innovations in communications technology and the possibilities ofADVERTISING AGENCIES AS MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS -Page33 -
anew era of interactive marketing (Blattberg and Deighton [1991)); Schrage
[1994)). The treatment of suppliers of communications services as multiproduct
firms should prove useful as a theoretical framework for analyzing the future
evolution of the organization of this industry.ADVERTISING AGENCIES AS MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS -Page34 -
FOOTNOTES
1See, for example, Berndt [1991), Canton and Penloff [1990], Comanor and
Wilson [1979], Hanssens, Parsons and Schultz [1990], Scherer and Ross [1990)
and Schmalensee [1989].
2The shares reported here were calculated by dividing the U.S. gross incones
for the largest 25, 100 and 500 agencies reported in Advertising Age
[1986,1988] by the total gross income (receipts) reported in the U.S. Census
of Services for 1977 and 1987.
3Galculated from expenditures and price indices for national advertising in
eight major media compiled by Robert Coen, Senior Vice President and Director
of Forecasting, Mccann-Erickson Worldwide, New York.
4conflict policy is a neglected area of study within the advertising field,
with two exceptions. Sirnan [1989] examined a large number of cases where
conflicts arose as a result of agency or client mergers in the mid-1980's.
Villas-Boas [19911 analyzed the conditions under which conflict policy may be
justified in the case where competing advertisers are oligopolistic rivals.
5mere is also evidence that the durability of agency-client relationships
varies systematically across product categories (Buchanan and Michel [1987]).
Hence, conflict policy not only affects the composition of an agency's
service/media market, but it also affects the riskiness of its client/account
portfolio and therefore its expected profitability.
6We contemplated using "flexible" functional forms such as the well-known
translog function (see Berndt [1991), Chapter 9), but found them to be
impractical since in our sample, for many agencies a number of outputs take on
zero values. With zero values, one cannot employ logarithmic forms such as
the translog, and use of other polynomial transformations is also
problematical.
7Parameter estimates and other econometric details relating to the estimation
of this model are shown in Appendix B, Table El. Further discussion is given
in Silk and Berndt [1993].
useful discussion of global scope economies and references to literature is
given in Bailey and Friedlaender [1982J.
9For a discussion of the nature of market equilibrium when economies of scope
are present, see Eaton and Lemche (1991].
10This provides an interesting illustration of the point emphasized by Teece
[1982), namely, that economies of scope by themselves are not sufficient to
explain the existence and boundaries of multiproduct firms in a competitive
industry, for transactions costs are necessary.
11Table B2 in Appendix B presents sample summary statistics for the agency
output variables discussed later in Section V.
discussion of some indirect evidence is provided in Silk and Berndt (1992,
Appendix A].
13See Table Bl in Appendix B for details.ADVERTISING AGENCIES AS MI.TLTIPRODUCT FIR1(S -Page35 -
14Thevariability across the media reflects of course the underlying
differences in the j parameter estimates described above.
15Those calculations employed Eq. (2) of thispaper and therefore were based
on the assumption that the firm was producing but one output. Thus those
calculations ignored the multiproduct nature of firms in this industry, and
the associated scope economies. Accordingly, our results here demonstrate
that size-related cost penalties incurred by small agencies are very modest,
due to available economies of scope.ADVERTISING AGENCIES AS MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS -Page36 -
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Medium-Specific Scale Economies (SCL)


























2.592 2.651 0.541 4.162 1.532
2.764 2.805 0.599 4.228 1.290
2.800 2.902 0.565 4.228 1.808
2.795 2.854 0.525 4.145 1.538
1.958 1.958 0.240 2.483 1.073
2.042 2.016 0.242 2.477 1.090
1.549 1.553 0.121 1.824 1.309
1.602 1.597 0.110 1.810 1.354




= Averageincremental cost of producing the output j
MC
—aC(Y)/aY
—Marginalcost of producing output j.
C(Y) —Totalcost of producing all n outputs
C(Y) —TotalCost of producing all n outputs except j.
Quantityof output jproduced.
Page 2 —TABLE 2 —Page43 -
















Medium-Specific Scope Ecoioznies (SCPJ)



































+0.0240 —6.952 11.116 +6.867—34.942
-0.4540 -5.844 9.700+13.166—34.625
+0.2455 -2.325 6.485 +10.632—29.47
+0.3215 -1.136 6.272 +10.924—33.20
+0.3770 —0.877 5.018 +3.0.571—21.713
+0.358 +0.015 3.806+20.353—18.017
+0.4655 +0.053 3.625 +12.346—13.325
+0.358 +0.461 1.793 +9.41.6—10.41
-0.337 -3.302 9.890+15.262-22.472
C( 1')) • C( — C( Y).100 1 C(Y)
/r.ere:
C(Y)
—Totalcostof producing output jseparately.
C(Y) —Totalcost of producing all n outputs excet Ijointly.
C(Y5 —Totalcost of producing all n outputs jointly
SCP(j) >0Economies ofscope exist for output .j ——i.e.,more efficient to produce
output jjointlyrather than separately.
SCP(j) 0 Disecononies of scope exist for output j, -_i.e.•moreefficient to
produce output separately rather than jointly.A-
APPENDIX A
DERIVATIONSOF INDICES FOR PRODUCT—SPECIFIC SCALE AND SCOPE ECONOMIES
Medium-Specific Scale Economies
Following Bailey and Friedlander (1982, p. 1030). we maydefineproduct-










AIC Average incremental cost of producing output j. j= 1,
n.
MC =Marginalcost of producing output j.
C(Yn) =TotalCost ofproducingall n outputs.
C(Y0 -j) TotalCost of producing all n outputs except j.
=Quantityof output jproduced.
= + =
Tosimplify thenotation, we surpress the individual agency subscript,
i,throughout.A- 2
Now for our preferred "Scale Plus Scope" model the average cost is:
= + f3exp(yf) (4)
To get total cost1 we multiply both sides of (4) by total output. y,
and obtain:
C(Y) = • =YZaS+ Y,jexp(yf) (5)
Noting that = 5jn' where Si is share of total output represented by
output j. we may re-write (5) as:
C)Y) = +Y3exp(yY) (6)
An expression for the total cost of producing all n outputs exçeot i may
be obtained in a similar manner. Total output excluding j is Y -= n(1-
andthus from (4), unit cost becomes:
n—i
= u1S1+ exp(y(l —j)Yn) (7)
i—i
Toobtain total cost for total output excluding j. we multiply both sides of
(7)by 1n1—





S1)Y EakSk} + (1— Sj)YnexP(r)e(—jYn).
wherej* k.A- 3
Substituting(6) and (8) for C(Y0) and C(Ynj). respectively, in (2) and
simplifying,we obtain:
MC =a3
— +_Eexp(yY)[l —(1 —Sj)exp(—ySY0)j (9)
To obtain an expression for the marginal cost of j,MC,we
differentiate (6) with respect to YJ. To do so. it is convenient to
substitute n ="j + 1n-j in(6):




UJY)• +Y exp(yY) exp(yY0 ) + exp(yt)ep(fl).
wherejs k.
dccv ( a a =+ — [;f3 exP(1Y)exp(fl_)] +— exp('yY)exP(1Yj)] (11)
Letthe second term in the above equations be:
W =VI=j3Yexp(y'j)exp(y'f.,) (12)
where:
z =13; exp(Y1) (13)
V =exp(y?3) (14)





Substituting (13), (14). (16) and (17) in (15) and simplifying:
=(Y+l)expflY) (18)
The third term on the right hand side of (11),
-—[Yn5exP(rfj)eXPvr!)] =TcDexc(yL) (19)
Substituting (18) and (19) in (11). we get:
MC = + +lIDexp(fl) (20)
Substituting (9) and (20) for AIC and MCJ. respectively in (1), we
obtain an expression for the index of product—specific scale economies in










Product-specific scope economies are defined as (e.g.. Wang and
Frjedlarider, 1985. p. 253)
C(Y ) +C(Y,.)—C(Y) SC? =' (22)
C(Y)
where
C)?1) =Totalcost of producing output jseparately
C(Y) =Totalcost of producing all n outputs jointly
C(Y) =Totalcost of producing all n outputs except jjointly
=Quantityof output j produced.
=Totalquantity of all n outputs produced. Y = +
Expressionsfor C(Yn) and C(?_) consistent with our preferred Scale
plus Scope model are given above in (6) and (8). respectively. The unit cost
of producing output jseparately(i.e.. Si =1.Y =Y3)is given by:
Ui =a+ I3exp(Y) (23)To obtain the total cost of producing j separately, we multiply both
sides of (23) by Yj
C(Y) Y *U
(24) =aY,+ Yexp(Y)
Notingthat =S3Y,(24) maybere-written as:
C(Y))SY[cL + exp(yS,Y)] (25)






S)Y)] SCP(i) — kI
—1(26)
,as +j3 •exp(yf)
wherej Ic andmdenotes specific media output m.
A- 6APPENDIX B
TABLE 81
SUN}{ARY STATISTICS FOR AGENCY OUTPUT VARIABLES
Variable and Measure Median Mean Std. Dev.Maximum Minimum
Product Line Breadth
Number of Different
Media Outputs Produced 7 7.085 1.467 9 2
Product Line Consolidation
Herfindahi Index of
Output Concentration 0.225 0.307 0.226 0.931 0.022
Agency Size
Natural log of Agency
Gross Incouie ($10 mill.) -1.129 -0.907 1.309 3.349 -3.275
Media Shares of Total
Agency Billings (1)
Network Television 5.556 13.791 16.625 64.941 0.105
Spot Television 12.195 16.138 15.183 79.962 0.031
General Magazines 7.588 10.295 9.524 63.636 0.017
Specialty Print 4.677 8.689 11.273 65.000 0.063
Newspapers 6.252 9.390 11.074 80.643 0.080
Direct Response 2.975 7.182 12.974 91.614 0.034
Radio 5.517 6.768 5.830 30.238 0.050
Display 1.505 2.971 4.210 31.765 0.001
Non-Media Services 45.165 47.309 27.312 97.366 0.002APPENDIX B -Pa8e8-2 -
APPENDIXB
Table 82
Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Parameters for Preferred S&S Model
(Ratio of Parameter Estimate to Robust Standard Error in Parentheses)
Pararneter* Estimate Parameter* Estimate
°TVL



















Sample Size: 401 No. of Free Parameters: 6 SER: 0.3705APPENDIX C
CROSS-SECTIONAL PRODUCT-SPECIFIC SCALEANDSCOPE REGRESSIONS
Product-Specific Scale Results
Recall fromEq.(14) in the text that our measure of product-specific scale
economies, SCLjk, indicates the extent to which an agency i exploits the
potential scale economies available as it adds a medium k to its product line and
thereby increases the volume of output it produces in that category from zero to
some particular level, ik• Consistent with this definition, it is of interest
to examine how an agency's realization of the available scale economies for that
media category k varies with the scale and composition of its output exoludina
chat category k -- theparticular medium or product under consideration.
Accordingly, we employ the following Set of agency descriptor variables:
Single Product Media category k's share of an agency i's
Concentration (Sik> total output (gross income, Yj)
Agency Size (In Y) Natural log of agency i's gross income,
excluding income from medium k: Yj —
(1-Sjk)'Yi
Product Line Breadth (nj) Number of different media categories
for which > 0. called nj, where
j —1,..,k,...,nj,...,N, and then
excluding one output k: nj —flj
-1
Product Line Index of product line specialization for
Specialization (Di) agency i, D, whose value may range from
zero (when output is perfectly diversified
or equally distributed across all cate-
gories. Le, Sjj —i/nj.for all •j) to
unity (when Sjj —1for some particular
medium j). More specifically, for agency i
excluding output k, Dj is defined as:1








i—ii iAPPENDIX C -PageC-2 -
Tofacilitate comparisons of regression results across media categories, we
computed standardized regression coefficients that are similar to conventional
partial regression coefficients except that each variable is scaled in units of
thesamplevalue of its standard deviation (Ezekiel and Fox [1959))..2 To
illustrate, in this application a standardized regression coefficient measures
the magnitude of change in a medium-specific scale economy index (SCL),
expressed as a proportion of the sample value of Its standard deviation
associated with a change in one standard deviation in some explanatory variable.
In Table C-i we display the values of these standardized coefficients
obtained by regressing each of the nine medium-specific scale economy indexes
separately on the set of four agency output variables. These regressions are
intended to serve only as a means of describing how scale economies covary with
agency characteristics; it would, of course, be inappropriate to draw any deep
structural or statistical inferences from these results.
INSERT TABLEC-iHERE
Examining Table C-i, we see that realization of scale economies is related
to the size and composition of an agency's output in essentially the same
systematic manner in each of the media categories- -as indicated by the
consistency of the signs and relative magnitudesofthe standardized regression
coefficients for three of the four descriptor variables: category share of total
output, log gross income, and the product line specialization index. No
consistent pattern of effects emerged for the product line breadth measure (the
number of different media categories encompassed by an agency's output), as
evidenced by instability in the signs of the relevant standardized regression
coefficients and generally small magnitudes relative to their standard errors.APPENDIX C -PageC-3 -
Theadjusted R2 statistics reveal that the set of four agency output
variables account for half or more of the cross sectional variability in each of
the medium-specific scale economy indices, except for the specialty print
category where the fit is somewhat lower (Rj —0.453).
These results imply that when an agency expands its output by adding a
category to its media mix, the greater its prior size and the more diversified
itsexistingmedia mix, the greater will be the extent to which it captures the
availablescale economies.3
Product-Specific Scope Results
In Table C-2 we present the results obtained when each medium-specific
scope economy index was regressed on a set of four agency output descriptor
variables similar to those investigated in the preceding analysis of scale
economies. y definition, product-specific scope economies are zero when a
INSERT TAgLEC-2HERE
product's share of total output is either zero or unity (see Eqs. (15) and (16))
and hence, the relationship between scope economy and output share is non-
monotonic. Accordingly, we employed a quadratic specification for the cateogry
share variable. tn Table C-2 standardized regression coefficients are given for
the linear and squared share terms. As in the analysis of scala economies,
measures of agency size and product line specialization and breadth were also
included in the regression. The values of the measures of these variables used
in the medium-speccific scope regressions reported in Table C-2 reflect each
agency's entire product line.4
Inspecting Table C-2, we find that the signs of the standardized regression
coefficients for each of the explanatory variables are almost perfectly
consistent across the entire set of nine media-related output categories. AsAPPENDIX C -PageC-4 -
indicatedby the values of the adjusted R2, together the four variables accounted
for roughly 50-aOl of the variance in seven of the nine scope economy indices.
The exceptions are the direct response and display categories where the cross-
sectional variation is comparatively limited, as may be seen from Table 2 in the
text which indicates that 78 and 85X of the agencies operating in these
respective categories realize a cost advantage through joint production.
The signs and magnitudes of the estimated coefficients for the quadratic
relation between scope economies and media share indicate that throughout most of
the relevant operating range, the relationship is a negative one.5 That is to
say, the cost advantage from joint production tends to decline as an agency's
output becomes increasingly concentrated in any single media category. The
exception is again the display category where the within-sample variability in
scope economies is smallest and no systematic pattern of relationship between
scope economies and share is discernible.
Turning to the results for the agency size and product line specialization
relationship, we see from Table C-2 that, with a single exception, the
standardized regression coefficients all have negative signs and appear otherwise
stable in the sense that the magnitudes of the coefficients are at least twice
(and most often more thart three times) the size of their standard errors. The
discrepant case is non-media services where the sign of the standardized
regression coefficient for the product line specialization index is reversed
(positive), but the size of the coefficient is less than twice its estimated
standard error.
An examination of the results for product line breadth, measured by the
nunber of different media output produced, indicates that the sign of the
standardized regression coefficient is negative for eight of the nine media
categories. However, the effect appears small and/or imprecisely estimated, asAPPENDIX C
-PageC-S -
indicatedby the tact that inonlytwo cases (general magazines and specialty
print) is the size of the coefficient more than twice its standard error.
Overall then, our results indicate that the cost advantage associated with
the joint as opposed to the separate production of a particular category of media
advertising tends to decline with increases in: (I) the share of total agency
output concentrated in that media category; (ii) agency size; and (iii)
specialization of the agency's media mix. While most agencies produce service
mixes that enable them to realize the benefits of joint production, we also find
instances where agencies appear to have become too large and/or overly
specialized in the sense that their operations are characterized by diseconomies
of scope, and cost savings could be realized by realigning their media mixes
and/or separating operations.
Note that media-specific scale and scope economies are related to agency
size and media share inthesame manner: the greater the share a particular
category of media advertising represents in the agencoy's total output and the
larger the agency, the more likely it is that an agency will have exhausted k.th
thescale and scope economies available for any of the categories of media
advertising that it produces. However product line diversification (or
specialization) is related to scale and scope economies in oosite Ways.
Whereas it is the agencies with more diversified (less specialized) media mixes
that are more likely to have exploited scale economies, it is the more
specialized (less diversified) agencies who operate with the smallest scooe
economies or perhaps who may even experience diseconomies of scope.APPENDIX C -PageC-6 -
APPENDIXC FOOTNOTES:
1Thisindex of output specialization is a normalized version of the familar
1-lerfindahi Index(H) often used as a measure of output concentration across
firmswithin an industry. Here we apply it to measure concentration of a
single firm's output across its product line. Since the lower bound of H
varies with n, it is not well suited for use incross sectional comparisons
like the presentsituationwhere the agencies differ in the number of media
categories (n) in which they produce output. To circumvent this problem, we
adopted the normalization shown below which rescales H for any particular n
relative to its lower bound, thereby yielding a diversification measure whose
range is independent of n.
21n Appendix ?, Table gi, we present summary sample statistics for the set of
four variables employed here to characterize the size and composition of an
agency's output.
3mere is one exception to this pattern and that occurs for the non-media
services category where the sign of the standardized regression coeffIcient
reportedin Table 2indicates that the capturing scale economies increases
withgreater specialization of an agency'smedia mix. This is the reverse of
the relationship found for the other eight categories, where the
specialized(or themore diversified) an agency's existing. media mix, the more
of the available scale economies it captures when expanding its media
offerings.We suspectthat this apparent anomoly maybeattributable to the
heterogeneous nature of this composite output category which includes a broad
arrayof services. Our suspicion ofaggregation issues here is reenforced by
thefact that the mean and variance of this category's share of agency's
outputis larger than those of any of the other eight categories.
4Recall that for the product-specific scale economy regressions, the size,
product line specialization and breadth variables were defined so as to
exclude the particular product (medium) under consideration. This
modification in the definitions of these three variables when used as
regressors in scope rather than scale regressions is necessary in order to be
consistent with the nature of the cost comparisons underlying the concepts of
product-specific scale and scope economies. Product-specific scale economies
describe the behavior of costs when total output is increased by adding
another product to the existing line. In contrast, product-specific scope
economies reflect the comparative costs of producing the same product line and
total output in two different ways.
5Theproportionof agencies with media share which exceeded the values of the
inflexion point implied by the estimated coefficients from the quadratic
scope-shareregressions varied from zero for network television to seven
percentfor radio and 30 percent for non-media services.— PageC—7-
TABLEC-i
REGRESSION RESULTS MEDIUM-SPECIFIC SCALE ECONOMIES










(Ratio of Coefficient to Standard Error)
Category
i's
Shareof Log Output No. of
Agency Agency Speciali- Media
Total Gross zation Outputs


































-0.603 -0.275 +0.139 +0.027
(12.419) (6.267) (3.075) (0.608)
—0.547 -0.395 +0.162 -0.053
(13.913) (10.771) (3.976) (1.507)
—0.393 -0.467 +0.199 —0.029
(10.328) (12.149) (4.918) (0.777)
-0.417 -0.429 +0.300 +0.087
(8.131) (8.513) (5.738) (1.589)
—0.463 —0.382 +0.330 +0.057
(13.105)(10.645) (8.700) (1.701)
—0.620 -0.377 +0.288 +0.099
(13.529) (8.422) (6.237) (2.017)
—0.391 —0.351 +0.418 +0.013
(11.219)(10.149) (11.140) (0.402)
—0.30S —0.407 +0.426 +0.039
(7.839) (9.840) (10.087) (1.000)
—1.151 —0.620 —0.109 —0.008
(30.489)(16.008) (3.664) (0.265)
CExciuding output j.TABLE C-2
REGRESSION RESULTS MEDIU}(-SPECIFIC SCOPE ECONOMIES
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-1.035 +0.296 -0.304 —0.068 —0.018
(9.239) (2.843) (9.074) (1.994) (0.583)
-1.060 +0.542 -0.542 —0.176 -0.051
(9.939) (5.373) (16.123) (4.222) (1.643)
-0.589 +0.176 -0.627 -0.157 -0.085
(6.432)(2.045)(16.432) (3.658) (3.658)
-0.661 -0.008 —0.439 —0.193 —0.115
(5.183) (0.063) (8.799) (3.686) (2.150)
-0.757 +0.346 —0.686 —0.279 +0.004
(7.341) (3.537) (17.258) (5.767) (0.105)
—0.667 +0.509 -0.487 —0.240 —0.117
(4.236) (3.384) (8.201) (3.585) (1.800)
-0.478 +0.340 -0.749 -0.338 —0.00001
(3.854) (2.951) (17.300), (6.435) (0.0004)
+0.029 +0.156 -0.539 -0.232 -0.003
(0.253)(1.399)(10.404) (4.207)(0.064)
-0.848 +0.631 —0.738 +0.174 —0.047
(4.965) (2.515) (2.555) (1.501) (1.373)